After the decolonization of Africa, many countries tackled problems they had never before faced. While freedom felt liberating, it also brought hardships that differed in nature from previous trials. Citizens sought to rebuild nations on their own, often with many differing beliefs, and they fought for leadership. Internal conflicts did not come as a shock. In one such case, civil war broke out for nearly sixteen years in Mozambique because two different parties fought for control of the government.1 The Mozambican people rid their country of the Portuguese in 1975, only to be wrecked internally by the nationalist groups FRELIMO, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, and RENAMO, the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana.After Mozambique gained freedom, both RENAMO and FRELIMO began to establish a following. Ken Flower, founder of RENAMO, served as Chief of the Rhodesian Intelligence Service and constructed his group out of soldiers from Portugal, Rhodesia, and Mozambique. While still an active political party today, in 1975 the primary purpose of this organization was to gather information on the whereabouts of members of the Zimbabwe African National Union, or ZANU, as well as to protect the Rhodesian-Mozambique border from guerilla warriors, such as FRELIMO members.2 FRELIMO, while not the main topic of this analysis, was crucial to the country of Mozambique and RENAMO itself. FRELIMO, the nationalist organization that liberated Mozambique from Portuguese rule, began to establish the first foundations of a government. While both parties sought a free Mozambique, strong ideological differences separated FRELIMO and RENAMO.

Ideologically, RENAMO was a firmly anti-communist group, while FRELIMO was fiercely communist.3 Given this vast difference in political principles, it is not surprising that they espoused quite different opinions of how they believed their country should be governed. Ideological differences, along with FRELIMO cutting off communication and closing its borders to its neighboring white ruled countries, marked the beginning of the civil war in Mozambique.4 Because of FRELIMO’s communist roots and the concomitant threats presented to their own governments, neighboring countries, such as Rhodesia, began to take precautionary measures and provided material support to RENAMO. By 1977, RENAMO focused on overthrowing FRELIMO and ZANLA, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army.5 During the civil war, a majority of RENAMO’s support came from Protestant religious institutions.6 While it is intriguing that RENAMO had relations with religious institutions, one must ask why religious organizations were in alliance with the group at all?

One pastor, who was located in the Angonia district of Mozambique during the time of the civil war, captivatingly testified that, “there is always fighting [in Mozambique,] and we do not know the difference between the sides. They all wear the same uniform and carry the same weapons. They all demand food even though we have none ourselves, and they all punish us if we feed the ‘enemy’ only difference is that at least RENAMO does not stop us worshipping God and teaching the Gospel.”7 His claims about RENAMO comes from a report titled, “Eyewitness Testimonies of Persecution and Atrocities,” published in September of 1986. While the pastors’ name is not given, this statement infers the notion that the nationalist organization RENAMO was in some way linked with and sympathetic to the organized Christianity. Throughout the history of this group, various religious organizations, such as Frontline Fellowship and religious leaders, such as Peter Hammond, came into contact with RENAMO and provided support for their operations in Mozambique. While Western countries considered RENAMO a terrorist organization because of their actions committed against the Mozambican population during the civil war, in reality, both RENAMO and FRELIMO committed atrocities for their own personal gain.8 Although the United States sided with the FRELIMO and portrayed RENAMO as terrorists, other conservative groups in the United States saw RENAMO as a group fighting for a democracy. Ultimately, each side used horrendous tactics, and one group cannot be called terrorist any more than the other. Since the majority of Western countries labeled RENAMO as a terrorist group, it appears odd that RENAMO received these Christian resources at all, and the question still remains: why were Christian organizations involved?

The idea of Christian organizations backing RENAMO marks an important contradiction within the Mozambican Civil War because, according to Prexy Nesbitt, it displays an example of Western involvement in Mozambique after decolonization.9 Western or “Western-like” nations such as, South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal wanted to rid Mozambique of the communist FRELIMO leaders and place into power a Mozambican government that would submit to a Western agenda.10 Thus, a significant amount of support flowed into RENAMO from these countries and Christian organizations within these nations. Steve Askin expands on the idea that Westerners used religion as a way to exercise control over nations, such as Mozambique. He describes how Christian groups such as Frontline Fellowship from South Africa, employed the church as a means for “white domination.”11 Thus, some scholars believe that western nations used religion as a way to manipulate RENAMO and extend the Western power. RENAMO, being sympathetic to Christians and fighting against communism, managed to establish a great foundation for support that came flowing into their organization from Western nations.

Although the secondary literature focusing on RENAMO is thin, most works recognize the religious connections of the movement and conclude Christianity was used by RENAMO in their workings as an organization. In comparison, FRELIMO failed to adhere to a certain religion and even attacked religious customs and practices.12 Ogbu Kalu argues that RENAMO had Christian support in their fight against FRELIMO.13 Glenda Morgan adds to Kalu’s argument, highlighting that RENAMO actually utilized FRELIMO’s resistance to religion by “exploiting” the support that came from religious institutions for their own benefit.14 Christianity was, she argues, a way that RENAMO, as a group, could gain “legitimacy and support” from external organizations.15

From the available sources, one can see that the help given to RENAMO stemmed from a variety of places with differing views and beliefs. Throughout this study, readers will see that internal problems and motives ultimately formed the backbone of support coming into RENAMO. Consequently, through assorted newspaper articles, memoirs, and the public propaganda of international organizations involved with RENAMO, this article argues that the external organizations contributing to RENAMO had an agenda of their own. Outside benefactors supported RENAMO because they knew they were gaining support for their own respective causes and gaining something from their contribution. Analysis of Western donor motivations for supporting RENAMO illustrates the symbiotic relationship between RENAMO and its supporters. Without sponsors from other countries, RENAMO would not have been able to operate within the confines of Mozambique and would have dissolved. Yet, as this article demonstrates, RENAMO’s continued existence was intimately linked to the rhetorical purposes of its respective donor organizations. As a result, this analysis presents a move away from examining RENAMO’s key beliefs into a more detailed examination of the core ideologies of the groups actually supporting RENAMO. Throughout this paper, I examine three different supporters of RENAMO, focusing on their motives and goals they wished to achieve. In the end, the overall assistance given to RENAMO stemmed from a diverse collection of benefactors that believed helping RENAMO would change its nationalist ideology and that RENAMO could and would help them spread their own ideas to what Westerners considered a “corrupted” African Nation. All the supporters of RENAMO can be seen as fighting for their own needs, and the key question assessed in each section is what did each group have to gain from their support of RENAMO?


When Ken Flower initially created RENAMO in 1975, he sought to establish a fighting force to counter a hostile nation whose internal stability was in turmoil. Thus, when RENAMO was first developed for the Rhodesian Special Branch of the army, the gains the founders sought to receive were quite obvious: security and inside information. In his memoir, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981, Flower discusses the creation of RENAMO and how it was to benefit Rhodesia. In a diary entry from March 26, 1974, Flower describes how he “managed to get agreement from the DGS (Direccao Geral de Segurança) [Portuguese Intelligence], to form ‘Flechas’ for trans-border operations in Mozambique where the security situation continues to deteriorate."16 The Flechas were “airborne commando-trained units established in 1973, by the Portuguese secret police on the Rhodesian frontier to combat national insurgency” and to monitor FRELIMO activities within Mozambique.17 Embedded within the establishment of the Flechas was the origins of the RENAMO nationalist group. Flower formed RENAMO to construct a security buffer against a violent Mozambique. Thus, in his formation of RENAMO, Flower demonstrated that his reason for supporting the group was the protection of his own country and the government within Mozambique.

After the original groundwork for the group was laid in 1973, through the Flechas, RENAMO began to grow and flourish. In 1974, middle-ranking officers displaced the Portuguese government in Lisbon in a military coup.18 Yet while the Portuguese presence in Mozambique waned, Rhodesia’s hold on the Mozambique border was also weakening. With the threat of the guerrilla war in Mozambique growing, Flower once again utilized RENAMO as a medium of protection.19 Flower had a duty to his people and their safety within Rhodesia. RENAMO was a precaution Flower used against a country that he believed could not control its own state affairs and its incipient guerrilla war.

The rebel fighters in Mozambique were having an effect on the economic situation in Rhodesia. Samora Machel, the President of Mozambique, had closed the border of Mozambique to Rhodesia, causing Rhodesia to rely entirely on South Africa for their economic survival.20 After the closure of this 800-mile border, Rhodesia and Mozambique were “on a war footing.”21 As a result of the closure, between 25 and 40 percent of Rhodesia’s trade had been cut off from Mozambique.22 As a result, a war broke out between Rhodesia and Mozambique. As Machel stationed “3,000 black nationalist guerillas...on the western border for attacks inside Rhodesia,” Ian Smith, the President of Rhodesia, and Flower fought back.23 After the border closing, the Rhodesian government continued to supply RENAMO with “logistical, military, and financial assistance.”24 To an extent, RENAMO was Rhodesia’s way of protecting themselves from Mozambican warriors, as well as gaining inside information into the internal affairs for Mozambique.

The main goal of RENAMO was to “gather information on FRELIMO and Zanla operations.”25 Flower expanded on this idea in his memoir as he describes how the “CIO (Central Intelligence Organization) was in a position to offer invaluable help through elements of the MNR (or RENAMO) who had been our ‘eyes and ears’ in these areas for more than five years and could assist the officers of Special Branch and Military Intelligence employed on those operations.”26 This operation, called “Operation Dingo,” was to be Rhodesia’s largest raid yet into Mozambique. To help maintain the element of surprise, Rhodesia used RENAMO as their group behind enemy lines. RENAMO had not only been fighting against FRELIMO, but also had been able to spy on them. They also were assisting with raids and seriously affecting Machel, “whose country was now suffering from extreme problems caused by damaged communications and food shortages” from RENAMO.27 While RENAMO was acting as a spy for Rhodesia and bringing harm to the Mozambican government, support continued to flow in from the Rhodesian government because they proved to be a vital asset in advancing Rhodesia’s goals. Without them, the inner workings of FRELIMO, as well as ZANLA within Mozambique, would be a mystery. Thus, through the creation and placement of RENAMO into Mozambique, one can see how the motives behind Rhodesia were of their own accord and political plan, and ultimately served their own neocolonial goals. Behind Rhodesia’s motives, one can see cultural, political, and economic reasons for wanting to extend an arm of power over Mozambique.However, the army in Rhodesia was not the only support RENAMO was receiving from within Africa.


In South Africa, Frontline Fellowship is a missionary group dedicated to serving persecuted churches in Africa and evangelizing in war zones. In their report, “Eyewitness Testimonies of Persecution and Atrocities,” Frontline shows its support for RENAMO in the way they describe the group and its members, as well as how they characterize FRELIMO. In 1986, Peter Hammond, the Founder and Director of Frontline Fellowship published an article describing the outrageous acts of violence committed against the organization by FRELIMO. One statement from the report describes the brutality committed against the ministry by FRELIMO:

FRELIMO persecuted the Church in our district very severely: ‘Anyone we find worshipping God is an enemy of the People.’ They would arrest or kill anyone who they found praying and preaching. ‘In this country there is no God except Samora Machel,’ they told us. During all these 8 years we had to meet secretly at night to worship. Then, in 1982, RENAMO chased FRELIMO away and for the first time we had freedom to preach the Gospel and gather for worship. 28

Frontline Fellowship’s relationship to RENAMO was clearly based on religion. RENAMO extended their sympathies to them, letting them preach and gather for worship in the areas they controlled.

Frontline Fellowship was a Christian ministry that had access to support and resources to give RENAMO. David Robinson argues in his dissertation that while official support to RENAMO from South Africa was cut of by the N’komati Accord in 1984, a few of RENAMO’s supporters within South Africa’s Reconnaissance Commandos, a special forces unit of the South African National Defense Force, joined Frontline Fellowship.29 He describes how the “former Special Forces [of South Africa,] provided RENAMO with what assistance they could independently of the Apartheid state, and even personally advised Dhlakama at his Gorongosa headquarters on a number of occasions.”30 Further, Steve Askin articulates how the main form of aid from Frontline “involved sending ‘missionaries’ to work alongside…Renamo…and internationally disseminating quasi-religious propaganda against governments and movements that had been targeted for attack and destabilization by the South African military.”31 With RENAMO receiving help, however, Frontline got something in return.

For Frontline, the reason for supporting a movement within Mozambique was that they were portrayed as fully contributing to an organization that believed in the same ideas they did. RENAMO was seen as an anti-Marxist, Christian organization. Consequently, Frontline was able to portray their organization as backing a group that stood for what many white, Christian, South Africans believed in. Frontline thought they were providing “spiritual warfare” against “communism,” in the nations they went out to.32 Bearing in mind that many white Africans viewed communism as “irreconcilable with Christian beliefs,” their support for RENAMO should not be surprising.33

Peter Hammond of Frontline Fellowship also described the account of missionaries going into Mozambique: “‘we preached to the [RENAMO] commander and saw him and his friend take off their hats and kneel in the dust accepting Jesus.’ This leader, they said, declared, ‘we need God’ and granted Shekinah ‘freedom to preach in any area they control.’”34 Hammond’s tales of his interaction with the RENAMO leader likely caused the white Christians of South Africa to see Hammond as making a difference, fighting for the faith.

By describing the actions of FRELIMO in the “Eyewitness Testimonies” as ferocious acts committed against Christianity and democracy, Hammond, in turn, garnered more support for their organization as well as RENAMO. Christians in South Africa reading this article were likely appalled by the atrocities. Thus, they would turn against FRELIMO, and support RENAMO, which would lead to their support for Frontline Fellowship.

Steve Askin addresses Frontline’s involvement, emphasizing that Hammond viewed the “Pretoria’s apartheid regime as a Christian bulwark against communism and atheism.”35 Since Hammond had a desire to fight communism and atheism, RENAMO proved to be the perfect group to support. Once again, by Frontline supporting RENAMO, they were not only prosthelytizing, but they were also gaining support from Christians within the country and around the world who shared their goals. Apartheid was a potent force in South Africa, and as Saul Dubow conveys, Christian-nationalism provided “intellectually coherent justification for apartheid.”36 Thus, the Christians of Frontline that agreed with Apartheid saw it as a fight against communism and atheism.

Throughout the history of Apartheid, the threat of communism against the Apartheid principles is evident. Apartheid was a “system of racial discrimination and white political domination adopted by the National Party,” from 1948 to 1994.37 The Apartheid regime wanted to position themselves alongside the Western nations and prevent black nationalist uprisings within the country. While black nationalists began to align themselves with the Communist party, the government decided to pass the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950, which outlawed the Communist Party of South Africa. As a result, C. R. Swart, the Minister of Justice in 1948, held a dictatorial power over communism and those associated with it.38 Considering that the South African government “defined nearly all opposition to their cause as communism,” many blacks and anti-apartheid advocates found themselves persecuted.39 Swart had sweeping powers. As a result, he kept dissidents from publishing documents, making speeches, attending meetings or “exist[ing] in any meaningful way.”40 Thus, anyone who spoke out against apartheid and the South African government could be branded a communist and become a pariah in society. Swart’s power was used to not only define communism as a Marxist-Leninist ideology, but any “doctrine [which brought about]…political, industrial, social or economic change within the Union by the promotion of disturbances or disorder.”41

According to Wessel Visser, a history professor at Stellenbosch University, “in South Africa the communists…aimed at destroying religion, confiscating private property, overthrowing the state and creating a black republic where blacks and Coloureds ‘would be boss and govern’.”42 He goes on to explain how, “Christian-nationalist alternatives to ‘communist’ trade unions” began to spring up because of the prejudice “against the ‘threat’ of non-racialism propagated by the communists.”43 Frontline Fellowship can be seen as an example of a Christian-nationalist union that rose up to fight the concepts of communism, and RENAMO was just one front in a larger war. Frontline battled against the spread of communism through their support of RENAMO because the teachings of Christianity during Apartheid threatened that communism and atheism would lead to an upending of the current racial and political order.

While often people try to separate the idea of religion and politics, the two cannot be separated in South Africa.44 The idea of atheism was associated with the idea of communism, and the idea of Christianity was attached to democracy. Visser describes how, “the avowed atheism of international communism understandably touched a raw nerve in the Christian-nationalist ethos of the traditional Afrikaner churches…[thus,] the church would act as a vanguard to shield the Afrikaner people from the ‘Red Peril’ [of communism] and its offshoots.”45 RENAMO can be seen as a fight against communism and atheism and for the notions of democracy and Christianity in Mozambique. While most likely not all Christians within South Africa believed that Apartheid, atheism, and communism overlapped, sources show that white South African Christians of this time supported Apartheid and RENAMO because they believed it was keeping out communism and atheism.


Western nations also supported RENAMO. For reasons similar to Frontline, Western governments portrayed RENAMO as an organization of fellow Christians fighting communism. In his article, Prexy Nesbitt quotes Michael Howard the President of Shekinah Ministries, from a letter he wrote in 1985 stating, “Mozambique is under control of an anti-Christian government…the RENAMO are fighting communism [and…] we believe that it won’t be long before RENAMO is one in full control of Mozambique.”46

Prexy Nesbitt states that his main goal is to demonstrate the “preoccupation of Western governments, especially the USA, with finding ways to terminate or, at the very least, to manage national liberation movements or the crises they create.”47 This was certainly the case within Mozambique as America through its support behind RENAMO. In the December 2, 1988, issue of Africa Confidential, Nesbitt describes America’s support to RENAMO:

The United States government appears to be sponsoring not one but two covert operations in support of the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO or MNR). Of the two US networks operating in support of RENAMO today, one seems to be sponsored by elements in the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), US military intelligence – working through civilian contacts. The second operation bears the CIA hallmark. Serving US officials say that the DIA and CIA have differing views on Mozambique.”48

During the Cold War, the United States led a global campaign to rid the world of communism. And Africa proved to be just another part of a worldwide struggle. As FRELIMO established a communist government in Mozambique, American support for its rival RENAMO was symbiotic. Money flowed, covertly and then overtly, to RENAMO as long as there were willing to fight communism.

At first, the United States stayed out of providing support for Mozambique because of the FRELIMO party and Samora Machel’s relations with the Soviet Union. However, as time went on, Mozambique became more non-aligned, and from 1983 onwards the State department’s relations with Mozambique’s FRELIMO government improved. However, major support for RENAMO began when Samora Machel planned his visit to Washington in 1985.49 Upon the announcement that he was coming to the U.S., right-wing conservatives began lobbying against his visit. Right-wing Americans saw him as a “ruthless pro-Soviet, anti-American, Marxist dictator,” and found his visit to America offensive.50 As a result, a campaign called “Conservative Caucus,” organized to try and stop his visit. When they failed to stop his visit, they instead initiated “a series of anti-Machel meetings.”51 In attendance was RENAMO’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs, who portrayed the organization as a victim of Samora’s communist reign, thus gathering commiseration from right-wing American organizations, Senators and Congressmen, as well as putting RENAMO on Americans’ radar.52 Machel sparked American conservatives’ international aid to RENAMO, because Americans saw communism coming too close to home. RENAMO was the institution fighting against communism in Machel’s own country, thus Americans saw RENAMO as an outlet to fight communism on a global level and make a statement to Machel.

Another aspect of Machel’s visit that sparked conservative protests was the relationship between Samora Machel and President Reagan. Doyle McManus argued, in an article in the LA Times that:

Conservative Republicans complain that aid for Mozambique is inconsistent with Reagan’s policies in Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Cambodia, where the Administration has been aiding rebels against leftist regimes. They called on the President to aid the rightist Mozambican National Resistance, known as Renamo, which has been fighting to overthrow Machel’s regime.53

Throughout his time in office, Reagan supported governments that aligned with the democratic policies preferred by the United States. However, support for Samora Machel and his relations to the FRELIMO party were not typical of American policy. McManus pointed out that in relation to Mozambique, “the United States is supporting a Soviet-backed Marxist dictatorship against a pro-Western rebellion.”54 Reagan’s reasoning for this support was because he believed Mozambique was veering away from the influence of the Soviet government and towards a more neutral stance. However, Howard Phillips, chairman of the Conservative Caucus argued that, “The President is engaging in what seems an ultimate act of hypocrisy by extending official honors to Samora Machel… The only evidence that Mozambique is tilting toward the West is that they are willing to take our money… We hope the President comes to his senses on this.”55 The article goes on to explain how the United States was “supplying Machel’s regime with $40 million in economic aid this year.”56 Senator Jesse Helms claimed that, “the Mozambique government… would inevitably collapse without Western sustenance…[and] we question whether it is in America’s strategic interest to prevent the inevitable toppling of a pro-Soviet, dedicated Marxist government which has ruthlessly suppressed its people and bankrupted its economy.”57 Conservatives believed the funds Reagan bestowed upon the FRELIMO government were the main reasons as to why Machel was claiming to change his governing policies. Without help from the United States, Machel’s government would fail and therefore, right-wing Americans believed that Machel was playing with America to receive their support. Because of Reagan’s unusual stance, senators, businessmen, and many others took it into their own hands to portray democratic American values using RENAMO as an outlet.

In the minds of conservatives, RENAMO was an example of a “pro-Western rebellion.” Therefore, they began funding support for their actions. As Reagan was propping up a communist regime by uniting with Machel, conservatives such as Howard Phillips, Senator Jesse Helms, and many others began supplying aid to RENAMO to show their opposition to the spread of communism and supporting communists. Right-wing Americans believed that the President was being foolish in his sympathies to Machel and that he should not negotiate with such a government.

The Heritage Foundation also endorsed RENAMO because of their anti-communist views. The Heritage Foundation is a “right-wing, think-tank [who was] influential with the Reagan Administration that actively lobbied for closer ties between the United States and RENAMO.”58 Its “mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.” William Pascoe, a policy analyst, describes RENAMO in his article for the Heritage Foundation as “pro-western Freedom Fighters” who by 1987 “controlled 80% of the countryside” in Mozambique.59 The Heritage Foundation also stated that RENAMO was a “popularly supported resistance” that was “establishing a provisional government in the large area of Mozambique in which the resistance movement operates freely.”60 The Heritage Foundation, as a supporter of limited government, saw a chance to promote their views in the US and Mozambique through their support of RENAMO.

Pascoe also believed that the Reagan administration should consider supporting RENAMO because of their democratic values. Pascoe wrote, “if the Chissano regime refuses to negotiate with RENAMO, the U.S. should signal strongly its break with the communists and place itself squarely on the side of the democratic resistance forces. Such action, in the context of U.S. assistance to the UNITA freedom fighters in Angola, would restore consistency to U.S. policy in southern Africa.”61 The Heritage Foundation wanted to provide RENAMO with resources because they firmly believed in fighting against communism. Supporting RENAMO was a public statement of their beliefs and another example of how American supporters tried to promote anti-communist views in America and around the world.


Today, RENAMO is no longer a guerilla movement within Mozambique. Instead, they act as a conservative political party to try and bring about their notions of change. Funding for their rebel movements began to die down in different areas for a variety of reasons. Rhodesia’s transition into Zimbabwe caused Ken Flower to turn over power of RENAMO from Rhodesia into the hands of South Africa. After a few years of South African control, the N’komati Accord on “Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness” was signed in 1984, halting South African resources.62 In America, horrific accounts of RENAMO’s atrocities against civilians, such as William Minters “Inside RENAMO as Described by Ex-participants” and Robert Gersony’s “Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique,” caused funding to stop because RENAMO had “extraordinary high [levels of violence]” against civilians.63 However, throughout RENAMO’s rebel reign, the international support RENAMO received had little to do with the state of affairs in Mozambique and more to do with the domestic situations in the countries from which the aid was coming. Through its Rhodesian roots, its connections to the Frontline Fellowship, and the anti-communist image conservatives in America sought to portray, RENAMO provides a great example of the influence that other nations can have on others internal affairs. RENAMO, after all, was not just a group of “armed bandits” acting of their own accord, but a legitimate “military-based organization” that had a significant impact of the economy and society of Mozambique thanks to its supporters.64 While RENAMO had similar views to the countries and organizations that gave it support, the aid that was given to them was directly linked to how RENAMO’s ideologies supported the domestic agendas of the governments and organizations that were giving it support. In a way, RENAMO’s relationship to its supporters can be seen as an aspect of neocolonialism within Mozambique in the sense that donors extended their economic resources and exerted their influence primarily for their own gain. As a whole, we can see how outside alliances had an effect on RENAMO’s efforts within Mozambique and how crucial the outsiders were to RENAMO’s operations.


1. Bjorn Enge Bertelsen, “War, Peace and Development in Mozambique: A critical assessment,” (paper presented to a ‘peace building and post-war aid’ workshop CMI, University of Bergen, Norway, June 2005).

2. ZANU was a nationalist group led by Robert Mugabe. Historical Dictionary Of Mozambique, 1991 ed., s.v. “Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO).”

3. Some members of the FRELIMO party came over to RENAMO because of FRELIMO’s communist views. Historical Dictionary Of Mozambique, 1991 ed., s.v. “Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO).”

4. Bertelsen, “War, Peace and Development.”

5. ZANLA is a military branch of ZANU. Alex Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique (York, England: Centre for Southern African Studies, 1991), 16.

6. Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, 106.

7. Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, 102.

8. Bertelsen, “War, Peace and Development.”

9. Prexy Nesbitt, “Terminators, Crusaders and Gladiators: Western (Private & Public) Support for RENAMO & Unita,” Review of African Political Economy, 43 (1988): 111-124.

10. Nesbitt, “Terminators, Crusaders and Gladiators: Western (Private & Public) Support for RENAMO & Unita,” 119.

11. Steve Askin, “Mission to RENAMO: The Militarization of the Religious Right,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion 18, no. 2 (1990): 29-38.

12. Glenda Morgan, “Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of RENAMO,” Journal of Modern African Studies 28, no. 4 (1990): 603-619.

13. Ogbu Kalu, “Decolonization of Nigerian Churches: The Nigerian Experience, 1955-1975,” Nigerian Heritage: Journal of the National Commission for Museums and Monuments 10 (2001): 35-59.

14. Morgan, “Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of RENAMO,” 603-619.

15. Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, 109.

16. Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-1981 (London: John Murray, 1987), 140. In Flower’s memoir, the note states, “Top Secret Note on ‘Flechas and the formation of the Mozambique National Resistance,’ April 1974.”

17. Historical Dictionary Of Mozambique, 1991 ed., s.v. “Flecha(s).”

18. Flower, Serving Secretly, xvi.

19. Flower, Serving Secretly, xvi.

20. Flower, Serving Secretly, 163.

21. “Mozambique closes border with Rhodesia,” The Spokesman Review, March 4, 1976, 38, accessed April 17, 2012,,1256649.

22. “Mozambique closes border with Rhodesia,” 38.

23. “Mozambique closes border with Rhodesia,” 38.

24. Historical Dictionary Of Mozambique, 1991 ed., s.v. “Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO).”

25. Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, 15.

26. Flower, Serving Secretly, 192.

27. Flower, Serving Secretly, 248

28. Peter Hammond, “Eyewitness Testimonies of Persecution and Atrocities,” Frontline Fellowship, accessed March 20, 2012,

29. David Alexander Robinson, “Curse on the Land: A History of the Mozambique Civil War,” (PhD diss., University of Western Australia, 2006): 222.

30. This quote comes from “a conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal,” quoted from Robinson, “Curse on the Land,” 222.

31. Askin, “Mission of RENAMO: The Militarization of the Religious Right,” 35.

32. Askin, “Mission to RENAMO: The Militarization of the Religious Right,” 29.

33. Wessel Visser, “Afrikaner Anti-Communist History Production in South African Historiography,” History Making and Present Day Politics, The Meaning of Collective Memory in South Africa, (2007): 308.

34. Peter Hammond, “We Are at War,” Frontline Fellowship Newsletter 1(1989) quoted in Steve Askin, “Mission to RENAMO: The Militarization of the Religious Right,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 18, no. 2 (Summer, 1990): 29-38.

35. Askin, “Mission to RENAMO: The Militarization of the Religious Right,” 29.

36. Saul Dubow, “Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of Race,” Journal of African History 33 (1992): 209.

37. Roger B. Beck, The History Of South Africa (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000), 125.

38. Rodney Davenport and Christopher Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc., 2000), 384.

39. Beck, The History Of South Africa, 129.

40. Beck, The History Of South Africa, 129.

41. Davenport and Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History, 385.

42. Visser, “Afrikaner Anti-Communist History,” 309.

43. Visser, “Afrikaner Anti-Communist History,” 308.

44. Tristan Anne Borer, Challenging the State: Churches as Political Actors in South Africa 1980-1994 (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 16.

45. Visser, “Afrikaner Anti-Communist History,” 308.

46. Nesbitt, “Terminators, Crusaders and Gladiators,” 119.

47. Nesbitt, “Terminators, Crusaders and Gladiators,” 111.

48. Nesbitt, “Terminators, Crusaders and Gladiators,” 119.

49. Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, 43.

50. See the Heritage Foundation, “National Security Record. A Report on the Congress and National Security Affairs,” 92 (June 1986), quoted in Vines, RENAMO Terrorism in Mozambique, 43.

51. Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, 43.

52. Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, 43. Quoted in Vines Notes, “Organizations that have in the past shown sympathy for RENAMO in the USA not named in the text include: About My Father’s business, Inc, KY; American Enterprise Institute, DC; Americans Freedom International, DC; 53Americans for Tax Reform, DC; Bashore International, DC; Citizens for America, DC; Coalitions for America, DC; Cuban American National Foundation, FL; Free Congress and Educational Foundation, DC; Fund for Africa’s Future, DC; Good News Communications, GA; High Frontier, DC; Open Doors Mission, Restore A More Benevolent Order Coalition (RAMBOC), CA; RUFFPAC, DC; Selous Foundation, DC; The Believers Church, CA; The Freedom League, DC; United States Global Strategy Foundation, DC; Vigeries Association, DC; World Missionary Assistance Plan (World MAP), CA. Senators Malcolm Wallop, Gordon Humphrey, Paul Tribble, and Congressmen Dan Burton, Robert Dornan participated in pro-RENAMO rally.”

53. Doyle McManus, “Mozambican’s U.S. Visit Irks Conservatives.” LA Times, September 18, 1985.

54. McManus, “Mozambican’s U.S. Visit Irks Conservatives.”

55. McManus, “Mozambican’s U.S. Visit Irks Conservatives.”

56. McManus, “Mozambican’s U.S. Visit Irks Conservatives.”

57. McManus, “Mozambican’s U.S. Visit Irks Conservatives.”

58. Karl Maier, Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), 187.

59. William Pascoe, “Mozambique Merits the Reagan Doctrine,” Backgrounder, no. 572, The Heritage Foundation, March 31, 1987.

60. “The Resistance can Win In Mozambique,” National Security Record, no. 92, The Heritage Foundation, June, 1986, quoted by Maier, Conspicuous Destruction, 187.

61. William Pascoe, “Mozambique Merits the Reagan Doctrine.”

62. Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, 21.

63. U.S. State Department’s Bureau for Refugee Programs, “Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique,” by Robert Gersony, (April, 1988).

64. Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, 3.